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Consumers chose between options that paired either an objectively inferior good with high relative standing (Your laptop is rated 60/100 in
quality; others' laptops are rated 50/100) or an objectively superior good with low relative standing (Your laptop is rated 80/100 in quality; others'
laptops are rated 95/100). Decision makers who try to make the “best” decision, known as maximizers (Schwartz et al., 2002), pursued relative
standing more than decision makers who are satisfied with outcomes that are “good enough” (known as satisficers). That is, maximizers were more
likely than satisficers to choose objectively inferior products when they were associated with higher relative standing. Subsequent analyses
investigating decisions across time showed that maximizers' interest in relative standing persisted even when the nature of the tradeoff was made
overt, suggesting it is a conscious aspect of the maximizer identity. Overall, results suggest that the maximizer self concept is more complex than
has been previously assumed—they are focused on relative outcomes in addition to absolute outcomes.
© 2014 Society for Consumer Psychology. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Keywords: Consumer decision making; Maximizing; Satisficing; Consumer identity processes; Consumer competitionImagine that you are given a choice to live in one of two
possible worlds. In World A, you drive a car that is a medium
quality brand rated 7/10 in parts and performance by
Automotive Weekly. Nearly all of your acquaintances' cars
are luxury models rated 9/10. In World B, you drive a car that is
a fair quality brand, rated 6/10 in parts and performance by
Automotive Weekly. Nearly all of your acquaintances' cars are
low quality models rated 4/10. If given the choice, would you
prefer to live in World A or World B?⁎ Corresponding author.
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1057-7408/© 2014 Society for Consumer Psychology. Published by Elsevier Inc. AThe focus of our current analysis concerns the conflict that arises
between the quality of an item and the relative standing that item
confers on its owner as compared to other consumers. Often in
the marketplace quality and relative standing are confounded
(e.g., high quality signals exclusivity), and the pursuit of the two
is not in conflict. However, quality and relative standing are
empirically separable constructs and are also distinguishable in
many important real world consumer contexts. Quality and
relative standing are separated, for instance, in the case of
imitation goods, since internal quality is low, but the appearance
of quality, and thus the good's relative standing, is high. The
literature would suggest that one set of consumers (maximizers)
are exhaustive in their search for the best product, while another
group of consumers (satisficers) are satisfied with products and
outcomes that meet a minimum threshold of acceptability and are
thus “good enough.” However, as seen above, the best can mean
different things. A consumer looking for the best could bell rights reserved.
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her the best standing relative to other consumers.
In the current analysis, we use tradeoffs of the type described
above to examine a question that past work has not considered:
whether maximizers and satisficers as defined by the well-known
individual differences scale developed by Schwartz et al. (2002)
not only differ in their levels of aspiration for a given standard,
but whether they can also differ in the type of standard they
choose to pursue in a given consumer choice situation—absolute
standards (i.e., product quality) or relative standards (i.e.,
positional standing). In examining this question we bridge two
literatures, one on maximizing and satisficing in decision making
and one on relative and absolute choices, which has been studied
in the decision making, psychology and consumer behavior
literatures (e.g., Easterlin, 1974; Huguet et al., 2009; Zhou &
Soman, 2003).
The maximizer/satisficer distinction
In an important and influential paper, Barry Schwartz et al.
(2002) demonstrated that consumers vary in how much they try
to optimize decisions in everyday choice contexts (see also de
Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff, 2007; Iyengar, Wells, & Schwartz,
2006; Nenkov, Morrin, Ward, Schwartz, & Hulland, 2008;
Parker, de Bruin, & Fischhoff, 2007; Swan, 1969; Wright,
1975; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007). Maximizers aspire to
acquire the best products and services. Satisficers, on the other
hand, are satisfied with products and services that are good
enough—those that meet a minimum threshold of acceptability.
Thus, while a maximizer may spend hours going from store to
store trying on jeans before she finds the best fit, the best style,
and the best price, as soon as a satisficer discovers a pair that is
good enough, she will purchase them and stop shopping.
Past work utilizing this scale has largely focused on
identifying outcomes and decision strategies that are associated
with the maximizing decision making style. As would be
expected theoretically, this work has shown that, relative to
satisficers, maximizers take more time when making decisions
(Chowdhury, Ratneshwar, & Mohanty, 2009; Nenkov et al.,
2008; Schwartz et al., 2002), include a larger number of
alternatives in their consideration set (Iyengar et al., 2006;
Nenkov et al., 2008; Schwartz et al., 2002), exhibit a greater
tendency to browse in online shopping environments
(Chowdhury et al., 2009), do more background research prior
to making choices (Iyengar et al., 2006; Nenkov et al., 2008),
and like to choose from a larger array (Dar-Nimrod, Rawn,
Lehman, & Schwartz, 2009). In one prototypical demonstra-
tion, maximizers reported being more willing than satisficers to
drive an additional 20 minutes to shop at a superstore that
allowed them to choose from a larger product array than was
available at their local store (Dar-Nimrod et al., 2009).
However, how does a maximizer decide what is best?
Generally speaking there are two types of standards that
consumers can use when judging what is “best”: absolute
standards and relative standards (e.g., Easterlin, 1974; Huguet
et al., 2009; Zhou & Soman, 2003). Past work looking at
individual differences in the maximization construct hasassumed that the primary—indeed “definitional”—goal of
maximizers is to achieve absolute standards: the best outcomes
in an objective sense. In contrast to this assumption, our major
hypothesis in the current paper is that the maximizer self
concept is more complex than has been surmised in previous
work and that it also includes an aspect of the self that
emphasizes relative standards—being the best. If so, then when
forced to choose between the two, maximizers may actually be
more willing than satisficers to forgo the absolute best under
some conditions. We predicted that satisficers, on the other
hand, will see little appeal in the relative best and thus, in
situations pitting the relative and absolute best against each
other, will be more interested in pursuing the absolute best than
maximizers. We detail our rationale for this prediction in the
next section.
Do maximizers emphasize relative standards more
than satisficers?
One observation from past work that is consistent with the
possibility that maximizers may focus on relative standards
more than satisficers is the fact that maximizers pay more
attention to information about their relative position than
satisficers (Schwartz et al., 2002, studies 2 and 3; Polman,
2010). In one demonstration, participants unscrambled ana-
grams alongside a confederate who was either faster or slower
than they were. While satisficers were unaffected by the
confederate's performance, maximizers used it as a standard of
comparison. They felt worse and rated their own ability as
poorer when the confederate was faster than they were
(Schwartz et al., 2002, study 3). Maximizers also report
engaging in more consumer-related social comparison both
before and after making purchases than do satisficers (Schwartz
et al., 2002, study 2), suggesting that they are interested in
obtaining information about the consumer possessions of
others.
However, while it is clear that maximizers are more
influenced by and interested in those around them, past work
has left the answer to the question of why maximizers are
interested in social comparison ambiguous. One possibility is
that maximizers always pursue the objective best, and others
can provide information about what that best outcome is in an
absolute sense. For instance, since college students do not know
the statistical distribution of anagram solving ability, knowing the
performance of a peer doing the same task can provide valuable
information about what an objectively good performance might
look like. This possibility of social comparison for the sake of
gathering information about the objective standard is articulated
by Schwartz (2004), “[w]hile, in theory, ‘the best’ is an ideal that
exists independent of what other people have, in practice,
determining the best is so difficult that people fall back on
comparisons with others” (p. 199).
However, another possibility can also explain the same
pattern of data—a possibility that has not been considered by
past work. To the degree that maximizers are hard-driving,
competitive people who go to great lengths to obtain the best in
life, rather than being single-mindedly concerned with pursuing
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different aspects that get activated in different contexts. On the
one hand, it may incorporate the goal of being a discerning
individual, which leads maximizers to relentlessly pursue
objective quality. However, on the other hand, in situations
where social rivalry is salient, maximizers' competitive spirit
may make salient a potentially competing goal—that of being a
“winner,” which may lead them to search for the best option in
a relative sense, in order to be better than other people rather
than to obtain the best absolute outcome. If so, then what may
have at first glance appeared to be social comparison in order to
obtain objective information about what constitutes a good
product or performance may have instead been the manifesta-
tion of a distinct facet of the maximizer self image: the desire to
be the best in a relative sense. Unfortunately, design
characteristics of the existing studies in the literature make it
impossible to determine which goal or “best” (i.e., absolute or
relative) maximizers are trying to attain through their focus on
social comparison.
In the present research, we take a deeper look at maximizers'
choices to examine whether they are single-minded in their
pursuit of objective quality as has been assumed in previous
work, or instead whether they maximize on different goals in
different situations—absolute quality when it is salient and
relative standing when it is salient. We test this question first by
investigating whether maximizers will expend more effort than
satisficers to obtain the absolute best as well as obtain the
relative best (in situations where the opposite standard is not a
consideration) or instead whether maximizers are only more
willing to expend effort in cases where absolute outcomes are at
stake. Results were consistent with the multifaceted
view—maximizers expended effort to achieve both types of
outcomes. We then investigate, across a wide variety of
consumer products and services, what maximizers and
satisficers choose when they are forced to make tradeoffs
between those two goals (absolute quality and relative
standing). Results again demonstrate the importance of relative
standards to maximizers by showing that, contrary to the
“definitional” assumption made by previous work, maximizers
are more likely than satisficers to choose objectively inferior
products, when those products are paired with a higher relative
social position (World B in the opening example). Subsequent
studies investigate the motivation underlying maximizers'
greater preference for positional standing relative to satisficers
by examining whether their choices vary as a function of
whether the products are publicly visible or not. We test this in
three different ways, by empirically manipulating the visibility
of the product (study 3), by using products that naturally vary in
their public visibility (e.g., brand of car vs. brand of pajamas;
study 4), and by assessing maximizers' and satisficers'
preferences for imitation goods, i.e., goods of lower quality
that are designed to have the outside appearance of higher quality
goods (study 4). If maximizers' emphasis on social comparison
reflects a concern for information about the absolute standards as
suggested by past work (Iyengar et al., 2006; Schwartz et al.,
2002), thenmaximizers should choose the same option regardless
of whether the outcome of their decision will be publicly visibleor not. In contrast, if maximizers are also motivated by social
rivalry, then there should be an interaction between the type of
decision maker (maximizer vs. satisficer) and the decision context
(public vs. private). When the two motivations are juxtaposed,
maximizers' competitive nature may lead them to prefer relative
standing to absolute quality more than satisficers, unless the
situation is private and no one will know about their superiority.
Overall, our results suggest that rather than having a single
“definitional” goal of aspiring to obtain the objectively best
outcomes that are the best in an objective sense, maximizers
have dual goals or identities that can be activated in different
contexts—in some situations their choices reflect the goal of
being a discerning and quality-seeking consumer, the primary
motivation that has been emphasized in past work; however, in
other contexts a distinct goal emerges that can under some
conditions be shown to contradict the first—the goal of being a
“winner” or better relative to others.
Study 1: Single minded or multiple goals?
Are maximizers specifically concerned with maximizing
absolute quality or is an interest in relative standing also a part of
the maximizer identity? Past work on the maximizer/satisficer
construct has focused on situations where objective quality is at
stake and has showed that maximizers expend more effort than
satisficers in order to obtain that goal. For instance, in one
demonstration, maximizers were more willing than satisficers to
complete an additional survey when doing so would allow them to
choose a chocolate from a choice set of 36 rather than a choice set of
6 (Dar-Nimrod et al., 2009). In another demonstration, maximizers
were more willing than satisficers to drive a long distance to an ice
cream parlor that had 200 flavors rather than 20. While it is clear
that maximizers are willing to commit effort in order to increase
their chance of securing an objectively superior outcome, will the
same process apply when the goal is relative standing?
If maximizers are specifically focused on obtaining the highest
quality item in an absolute sense, then they should only choose to
exert extra effort in contexts where that goal is salient. On the
other hand, if the maximizer self concept also includes the
concept of being the best, then when social position is a salient
goal they should maximize on it too. To test whether maximizers
single-mindedly pursue the absolute best or instead are interested
in maximizing multiple goals, study 1 presented participants with
two types of contexts (i) quality contexts where quality is relevant
and relative position is not (e.g., the quality of a dinner that will
be consumed alone) and (ii) relative position contexts where
relative standing is relevant but absolute quality is not (e.g.,
winning a contest where the only prize is status). For each type of
scenario, participants' willingness to expend effort to obtain a
higher level of the motivation (i.e., a better quality dinner;
winning the competition) was assessed.
Method
Participants
Two hundred and seven participants from an online panel
completed this experiment in exchange for payment. Two
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analysis.
Quality versus relative position scenarios
Participants saw four scenarios, two that focused specifically
on situations where quality was relevant and relative standing
was not and two that focused specifically on situations where
relative standing was relevant and quality was not. For instance,
one of the quality scenarios read as follows:
Imagine that you need a pair of long underwear for an
upcoming skiing trip. There is a pair that you can purchase
right away that would be fine. There is also a better quality
pair on sale for the same price, but to get it you would have
to walk all the way to the other side of the mall to a different
store. How likely would you be to purchase the pair that is
on sale? (1 = not at all likely; 7 = very likely)
And one of the relative position scenarios read as follows:
Imagine that your friends gather to play a heated scrabble
tournament every month. How hard would you work to win?
(1 = not at all hard; 7 = very hard)Maximization scale
Participants then completed the 13-item maximization scale
(Schwartz et al., 2002), which assesses the degree to which
individuals try to optimize when making choices (e.g., “When I
watch TV, I channel surf, often scanning through the available
options even while attempting to watch one program;” “When
shopping I have a hard time finding clothing that I really love”
(α = .66 for the scale)). Each question was measured on a
7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree).
The more (less) participants agree with the items, the more
likely they are to be maximizers (satisficers). Participants'
average maximization score was a 4.22 (SD = .77) and the
median score in the sample was a 4.23. After completing the
maximization scale, participants reported demographic infor-
mation and were thanked for their participation.
Results
Analyses showed that participants' maximization scores
were positively correlated with their willingness to expend
effort for both the quality (r(205) = .16, p b .05) and the status
(r(205) = .13, p = .06) scenarios. These results suggest that
rather than being solely concerned with achieving the
objectively best outcomes, the maximizer self concept is
multifaceted—maximizers are willing to expend effort both to
obtain absolute quality and also to obtain status when these two
goals are not directly opposed to each other. Satisficers, on the
other hand, are less willing to expend extra effort in securing
either quality or status when those goals are presented separately.
Design of experiments 2–4
Study 1 showed that maximizers are driven to maximize on
both objective quality and on relative standing when the twooutcomes are not in opposition to each other. In studies 2–4 we
investigate what maximizers and satisficers choose when those
two standards are pitted against each other as competing
motivations. In particular, we were interested in examining
whether maximizers' interest in their relative social position
will ever override their desire for quality, the goal that previous
work has considered to be “definitional” to the maximizer
construct. Participants made a series of choices that required
tradeoffs between the absolute quality of a good and the
owner's positional standing, as illustrated in our opening
example. In each case, one alternative paired a higher absolute
standing with a lower relative standing, whereas the other
alternative paired a lower absolute standing with a higher
relative one. Following Solnick and Hemenway (2005), we
refer to the choice of a higher absolute standing at the expense
of a lower relative standing as an absolute choice; conversely,
we refer to the choice of a higher relative standing at the
expense of a lower absolute standing as a positional choice. In
terms of the opening example, choosing World A over World B
is an absolute choice, whereas choosing World B over World A
is a positional choice.
Study 2: Absolute versus positional choices
Consumers saw 29 tradeoff scenarios encompassing a wide
variety of domains including consumer products (e.g., UV
protection of sunglasses; MP3 player sound quality), experi-
ences (e.g., length of spring break trip; number of invites to
formals), personal attributes (e.g., personal physical shape), and
professional status dimensions (e.g., number of job offers;
grades on exams). For each scenario, participants chose
whether they would prefer an absolute or a positional option.
In addition to examining maximizers' and satisficers' overall
preferences for the two types of options, the large number of
tradeoff scenarios allowed us to investigate an additional
question of theoretical interest—whether the motivation behind
maximizers' and satisficers' preferences for one type of option
over the other is explicit and conscious or instead whether it is
implicit and below participants' conscious awareness. That is,
while the specific nature of the tradeoffs—that consumers must
choose between quality and status—is present in each scenario,
the full implications of what choosing one option over another
signifies likely are not evident to participants in the first several
choices. However, as participants complete more and more
trials, it becomes very clear. After multiple repeated trials, for
instance, the choice of a positional option likely starts signaling
to the self “I am the type of person who would rather take a
lower quality item in order to be better than others.” Given
these differences in the explicitness of the implications of the
tradeoffs for the self over time, an interesting question is
whether maximizers' and satisficers' choices of one type of
option over another will vary across the repeated trials. If the
proportion of absolute versus positional choices they make
remains stable over time, it would suggest that the implications
of those choices are consistent with participants' conscious
identities and compatible with how participants see themselves.
On the other hand, if participants' choices of one type of
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pattern would suggest that that type of choice is not
identity-relevant since conscious awareness of its implications
leads consumers to move away from choosing that option.Method
Participants
Fifty-eight undergraduates (41% male) at a large, public,
Southeastern university completed this experiment and several
unrelated questionnaires as part of an extra credit assignment in
their introduction to marketing course.Positional versus absolute choices
Participants read the following instructions (adapted from
Solnick & Hemenway, 2005):
Nearly all choices in life involve tradeoffs. In the questions
that follow, two different states of the world are presented.
You are asked to take a few moments to carefully consider
both options and pick which of the two you would prefer.
The questions are independent. For each question, pick
either the first option or the second option. There are no right
or wrong answers; we are looking for your own personal
choices.
The computer then presented participants with 29 choice
scenarios one at a time in a random order (see Appendix A for
examples). For each choice domain, two possible states of the
world were offered and participants chose the one they
preferred. One state of the world always represented a better
absolute outcome paired with a lower positional standing, and
the other always represented a lower absolute outcome paired
with a better positional standing. For example, the question
involving the luxury level of car read as follows:
A Your car rates 5 out of 10 points on a luxury scale; others'
cars rate 3 out of 10. [Selection indicative of positional choice]
B Your car rates 7 out of 10 points on a luxury scale; others'
cars rate 9 out of 10. [Selection indicative of absolute choice]
The order of options was randomized such that 14 of the 29
scenarios presented the option indicative of a positional choice
first, while the other 15 scenarios presented the option
indicative of an absolute choice first. We created a composite
variable to represent the average number of times consumers
chose an absolute versus a positional choice option across the
29 scenarios. Absolute choices were coded as “0” and
positional choices were coded as “1,” meaning the composite
variable could range from 0 (chose absolute for all 29 items) to
1 (chose positional for all 29 items).Maximization scale
After completing the choice task, participants completed the
13-item maximization scale (Schwartz et al., 2002) (α = .70 forthe scale). Participants' average maximization score was a 4.36
(SD = .77) and the median score in the sample was a 4.42.
Participants then reported demographic information and were
thanked and debriefed.
Results
We predicted that when relative and absolute outcomes are
placed in opposition to each other, maximizers would
emphasize relative standards more than satisficers. A regression
using the composite variable representing the average number
of times participants chose an absolute versus a positional
option as the dependent variable and consumers' maximization
scores as the independent variable showed a significant positive
relationship, such that the higher consumers' maximization
scores, the more likely they were to make a positional choice
across the 29 choice domains, preferring a higher relative
standing even when it came with a lower absolute outcome
(β = .46, t = 3.88, p b .001). This relationship was the same
regardless of the reference group investigated (“others”: B =
.41, t = 3.34, p b .01; friends: B = .38, t = 3.09, p b .01, and
peers/acquaintances: B = .30, t = 2.34, p b .05). Thus, consis-
tent with predictions, maximizers appear to be more concerned
with relative standing than satisficers, even when that relative
standing comes at the cost of objective quality.
The statistical analyses described above were performed
using consumers' maximization scores as a continuous
variable. However, for ease of visual presentation, Table 1
presents the percentage of maximizers (defined as those with
maximization scores above the median of our sample) and
satisficers (defined as those with maximization scores below
the median of our sample) who made a positional choice for
each of the choice domains. Out of the 29 contexts studied,
maximizers chose positionally more than satisficers in 23,
while satisficers chose more positionally than maximizers in
only six; none of the six reversals were significant (exam
grades: β = − .42, Wald = .51, p = .47; poker winnings: β =
.01, Wald = .001, p = .97; Facebook friends: β = .16, Wald =
.15, p = .70; rooms in house: β = − .19, Wald = .29, p = .59;
eating out: β = .24, Wald = .48, p = .49; going out: β = .63,
Wald = 2.79 p = .10).
Identity processes: Examining choices over time
Is maximizers' interest in positional standing a conscious
and explicit part of the maximizer identity—a conscious way of
thinking about the self—or instead is it driven by a more
implicit motivation of which they are not consciously aware?
To test this, we divided the 29 choice domains into five groups
based on the order in which they had been presented to
participants (i.e., the first six, the second six, and so on).
Results showed that while satisficers' tendency to choose
positionally diminished over time (% choosing positional
option: Trials 1–6: 33%; Trials 7–12: 30%; Trials 13–18:
24%; Trials 19–24: 22%; Trials 25–29: 20%), maximizers'
interest in positional options remained stable (% choosing
positional option: Trials 1–6: 39%; Trials 7–12: 36%; Trials
13–18: 37%; Trials 19–24: 38%; Trials 25–29: 33%). This
Table 1
Study 2: Percentage of maximizers (subjects above the median of the sample on
maximization score) and satisficers (subjects below the median of the sample on
maximization score) choosing the positional option in each choice domain.
Maximizer Satisficer Gap
(Max – Sat)
Luxuriousness of your car 41 7 34
Quality of your car 45 14 31
Quality of your sweater 41 21 21
Number of job offers 28 10 17
Level of your personal education 45 28 17
Yearly income 31 14 17
Chance of getting a job two months
after graduation
31 14 17
Number of invites to formals 48 31 17
Personal physical shape 31 17 14
Sound quality of your MP3 player 55 41 14
Time spent studying for test 31 21 10
Quality of beer you are drinking 24 14 10
Number of days you are in Florida
for spring break
10 0 10
UV protection of your sunglasses 48 41 7
Frequency of sex per month 21 14 7
Time spent training for athletics 31 24 7
Number of bids received for a
fraternity/sorority
31 24 7
Number of invites to parties 48 45 3
Frequency of going to movies 45 41 3
Quality of suit for interview 45 41 3
Number of DVDs owned 21 21 0
What row your football seats are in 17 17 0
Quality of spring break destination 34 34 0
Grades on exams 7 10 -3
Poker winnings 28 31 -3
Number of Facebook friends 17 24 -7
Number of rooms in house 41 48 -7
Frequency of eating out per month 38 52 -14
Frequency of going out per week 21 55 -34
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relative standing is an overt part of the maximizer identity. See
Table 2 for the pattern of results.
Discussion
Study 2 shows that, rather than always striving for the
objectively superior product or outcome, maximizers are more
willing than satisficers to choose an objectively inferior
situation when it allows them to gain a relative advantage.Table 2
Study 2: Positional choice over time: percentage of maximizers (subjects above
the median of the sample on maximization score) and satisficers (subjects below
the median of the sample on maximization score) choosing the positional option
in each time category.
Maximizer Satisficer Gap (Max – Sat)
First six choice domains 39 33 6
Second six choice domains 36 30 6
Third six choice domains 37 24 13
Fourth six choice domains 38 22 16
Final five choice domains 33 20 13This pattern was found across a broad spectrum of consumer
choice domains, ranging from the luxuriousness of the car
consumers wish to own to the quality of beer they would like to
drink. These results call into question the “definitional”
assumption made by previous work that maximizers' main
interest is in achieving the best outcome in an objective sense
(e.g., Schwartz et al., 2002) by showing that maximizers
emphasize relative outcomes in their choices more than
satisficers, even in situations where the absolute standard is
clear.
Is an interest in relative standing an explicit part of the
maximizer identity?
The results from study 1 paired with the overall choice data
from study 2 demonstrate that maximizers are both more
interested in relative standing than satisficers, and also that this
interest can even override their desire for objective quality
under some conditions. This suggests that the goal of relative
standing is important to maximizers and part of their self
concept. Analyses examining participants' choices over time go
further to suggest that this interest in social comparison is
actually an explicit self identity of maximizers. Specifically,
while satisficers exhibited a decreasing tendency to choose
positional options over time, suggesting that once the tradeoff
became overt they may have realized that it is not socially
desirable to sacrifice absolute standing to be better than others,
maximizers' preference for positional options remained stable
over time. This stability suggests that their interest in “winning”
in a positional rather than an absolute sense is a way of viewing
the self that they are comfortable with.
Variation in choice domains
Interestingly, while maximizers were more concerned with
their relative position than satisficers overall, there was some
variation across the domains. One factor that appears to be
notable in explaining this variation has to do with the public
visibility of the choice outcome. That is, in some of the choice
domains, the positional disadvantage is naturally more likely to
be highly visible and known to others (e.g., quality of car,
sweater), while in other domains it is more likely to be hidden
from public view and known only to the decision maker (e.g.,
frequency of sex per month, number of DVDs owned). The
maximizer–satisficer difference appears to be larger in the
visible domains than in the less visible ones. To investigate this
quantitatively, two judges, blind to hypotheses, judged each
scenario on the basis of how publicly visible the item in the
scenario was. Results correlating the judges' average visibility
ratings with the maximizer/satisficer gaps (i.e., the % of
maximizers choosing the positional option minus the % of
satisficers choosing the positional option) for each scenario
showed a significant positive relationship, r(27) = .37, p b .05,
such that the maximizer–satisficer difference was greater the
more publicly visible the outcome of the choice was. While
this pattern is suggestive, it is based on naturalistic scenarios
that were not specifically designed to examine the public
visibility issue. Studies 3 and 4 explore this possibility more
systematically.
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The role of visibility is important from both a theoretical and
practical standpoint. Visibility is important theoretically
because it can increase our understanding of why maximizers
are more influenced by social comparison than satisficers. Are
maximizers looking to others because other people can provide
information about what is the best in an objective sense or are
maximizers looking to others to compete with them in an effort
to be the best?
In studies 3 and 4 we disentangle these two possibilities. If
maximizers' primary focus is on seeking information about
what constitutes the best absolute outcome, then the public
visibility of the outcome should not be relevant, and they
should choose the same option in public as in private. In
contrast, if maximizers' focus on social comparison is
motivated by interpersonal competition and a desire to be the
best in a relative sense, then they may be more likely to choose
positionally when others will know about the decision outcome,
but they may instead choose to maximize objective quality
(even when it places them at a positional disadvantage) when
the outcome is private. On the other hand, since past work
indicates that satisficers are not interested in social comparison,
we predicted that their choices should not vary as a function of
the public visibility of the outcome.
Studies 3 and 4 examine this question using two different
methodological approaches. Study 3 directly manipulates
whether the positional advantage is visible to others or not
and study 4 investigates the tradeoffs that maximizers and
satisficers make for consumer products that are either typically
consumed in public (e.g., MP3 player, sweater) or in private
(e.g., pajamas, trash compactor) as well as examines implica-
tions for imitation products—naturally occurring “positional”
choices of lower quality that are designed to have the outside
appearance of high quality goods.
Study 3: Manipulating choice outcome visibility
Based on the results of study 2, we predicted that there
would be an interaction between consumers' maximization
scores and the visibility of the choice outcome on consumers'
tendency to make positional versus absolute choices. When the
positional advantage is visible to others, we predicted that
maximizers would be more likely than satisficers to optimize
social position, even when it means accepting a lower quality
product. However, when the positional disadvantage is private
and thus concealed from the public eye, we predicted that
maximizers and satisficers would be equally likely to choose
the objectively superior option.
Method
Participants
A total of 315 participants (44% males) at a large, public
university in the Midwest and a large, public university in the
Southeast completed the study. Participants at the Midwestern
university (University 1; N = 181) completed an online surveyafter being randomly emailed from the university directory.
Those at the Southeastern university (University 2; N = 134)
participated as part of an extra credit assignment in their
introduction to marketing course.
Positional versus absolute choices
Participants read instructions identical to those in study 2.
After reading the instructions, the computer presented partic-
ipants with the choice scenarios, one at a time. At University 1,
the scenarios involved a necklace that varied in its value, an
annual salary that was either higher or lower, and the quality of
one's sex life, which varied on degree of satisfaction. At
University 2, the scenarios involved a sweater that varied on the
quality of its fabric and a pair of sunglasses that offered varying
levels of UV protection. Each choice scenario offered an
absolute option and a positional option, and participants chose
the one they preferred (see Appendix B for examples).
Public visibility
To test whether the visibility of the decision outcome
would influence participants' choices, a Public Visibility
factor was manipulated between-subjects. Participants in
the Visible condition were explicitly told that others would
be aware of the outcome, while those in the Non-Visible
condition were explicitly told that others would not
become aware of the outcome. For example, the Visible
(Non-Visible) condition for the sweater scenario read as
follows:
You recently received a gift of a new sweater. Its value is in
the fabric quality, so most people are able to tell its worth
just by looking at it (so most people cannot tell its worth just
by looking at it). Which would you prefer?A Your sweater is a fair-quality brand. Nearly all your
acquaintances have low-quality sweaters. [Selection indica-
tive of positional choice]
B Your sweater is a medium-quality brand. Nearly all your
acquaintances have real designer sweaters. [Selection
indicative of absolute choice]
Visible condition participants saw publicly observable
versions of all the choice domains; Non-Visible condition
participants saw private versions of all the choice domains.
Maximization scale
Participants filled out the maximization scale (α = .61)
(Schwartz et al., 2002), reported demographic information and
were thanked and debriefed. The mean maximization score for
students at University 1 was 4.33 (SD = 4.45) and for students
at University 2 it was 4.45 (SD = 0.70).
Design
Study 3 was a Public Visibility (visible vs. non-visible) ×
Maximization Score (continuous factor ranging from 1 to 7)
between-subjects design with choice (positional vs. absolute) as
the dependent variable.
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Composite variables representing the mean tendency to
choose positionally across the choice domains were created
for each university (absolute = 0; positional = 1). These
composite scores as well as participants' continuous maximi-
zation scores were standardized within each university and
then combined for analysis. There was no effect for university
on any of the analyses, so this variable is not discussed
further.
A regression was performed on positional choice with
Maximization Score, a dummy variable for Visibility, and their
interaction as the independent variables. As predicted, the
results showed a significant two-way interaction between
Maximization Score and Visibility (β = .26, t = 2.35,
p b .05). Also as predicted, simple effects analyses showed a
positive association between an individual's score on the
maximization scale and positional choice in the Visible
condition (β = .26, t = 3.46, p b .01), but not in the
Non-Visible condition (β = − .004, t = − .05, p = .96). Fig. 1
depicts this interaction. Because the interaction graph shows a
slight (nonpredicted) tendency for satisficers to choose more
positionally in the non-visible than in the visible condition, we
ran spotlight analyses to assess whether that unpredicted
reversal was significant. Results showed that it was not.
While maximizers (+1 SD) made more positional choices when
the outcome of their choice would be visible to others than
when it would not, t(311) = 2.09, p b .05, satisficers' (−1 SD)
choices did not differ as a function of choice outcome visibility,
t(311) = −1.24, p N .20.
Discussion
Study 3 replicates and extends the results of study 2 by
demonstrating that, when social position and product qualityFig. 1. Study 3: Regression lines for standardized average positional choice as a
function of standardized maximization score in the visible and non-visible
conditions.are pitted against each other in a publicly visible situation,
maximizers place more weight on social position than product
quality compared to satisficers. Taken by themselves, maxi-
mizers' public choices are compatible with the idea that they
use social comparison information to learn about the absolute
quality of outcomes, allowing them to determine what is the
best outcome. If so, however, maximizers' choices should be
independent of whether others can determine the quality of
their possessions. Empirically, this is not the case as the results
from the non-visible condition indicate. Instead, our results
suggest that maximizers value a high relative standing more
than high absolute quality and only maximize the latter when it
does not threaten the former; hence, they attend to relative
standards in public, but absolute standards in private. The
choices of satisficers, on the other hand, are not affected by the
publicity of the choice outcome. These observations add
complexity to the past literature by showing that maximizers
and satisficers as measured by the widely-used Schwartz et al.
(2002) scale not only differ in the aspiration level they have for
a given standard, as proposed by past work, but, in certain
situations, they also appear to differ in the actual standards to
which they aspire. In identifying an important moderator
variable—the public visibility of the choice outcome—study 3
suggests that the same hard-driving and competitive nature that
may drive maximizers' relentless pursuit of obtaining the best
product may also make them interested in being the best in
social competition situations.
Study 4: Maximization and choices among publicly versus
privately consumed products and imitation products
Study 4 has two goals. First, it extends our investigation to
a related but distinct contextual variable by examining the
tradeoffs that maximizers and satisficers make between
product quality and relative position for products that are
typically consumed in public (e.g., brand of one's car) versus
private (e.g., brand of one's pajamas). Based on the results
from study 3, we predicted that the public nature of a
product's consumption would moderate the choices partici-
pants made, with maximizers being more willing than
satisficers to choose a lower quality product that was paired
with a better relative standing for publicly consumed products
(e.g., MP3 player, sweater). We further predicted that
maximizers and satisficers would be equally likely to
emphasize product quality in their choices when the products
are typically consumed in private and not visible to others
(e.g., pajamas, trash compactor).
A second goal of study 4 was to investigate whether
maximizers and satisficers differ in their preferences for fake
products—products that are of inferior quality but actually
appear from the outsider's perspective to be high quality
goods. If maximizers place more weight on social standing
than objective quality in publicly observable situations, they
may express a preference for such imitation goods. In
contrast, satisficers, who are generally not interested in
social comparison, should see little appeal in imitation
products.
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Participants
One-hundred and three participants (62% male) from a
large, public university in the Midwest completed this
experiment online after being randomly selected from the
student directory (N = 73) or as part of a subject pool
requirement (N = 30).
Positional versus absolute choices
Participants read instructions that were identical to study 2.
Participants were then presented with 15 choice scenarios one
at a time in a random order for each participant. The scenarios
covered an array of consumer products (see Appendix C for
examples). For each product, participants chose whether they
would prefer an absolute or positional option. For example, the
laptop scenario read as follows:
A.1 Your laptop was rated 60/100 in quality by Consumer
Reports. Nearly all your fellow students have low-quality
laptops rated 50. [Selection indicative of a positional
choice]
B Your laptop was rated 80/100 in quality by Consumer
Reports. Nearly all your fellow students have
top-of-the-line laptops rated 95. [Selection indicative of
an absolute choice]
The higher quality (but worse positionally) option was
always described first and the positional option was always
described second. Composite variables representing the mean
tendency to choose positionally across the ten Visible choice
domains and the five Non-Visible choice domains were created
using the same procedure as in studies 2 and 3 (absolute
choices = 0; positional choices = 1).
Public versus private consumption
Publicly consumed products were defined as those that
many people other than the decision maker would see in
everyday situations (Bearden & Etzel, 1982; Childers & Rao,
1992; Grewal, Mehta, & Kardes, 2004). Ten of the 15 products
were chosen because they met this criterion (e.g., sweater,
purse). Privately consumed products were defined as those that
not many people other than the decision maker would see on a
daily basis. Five of the 15 products were chosen because they
met this criterion (e.g., pajamas, trash compactor). The
manipulation of public versus private products was done
within-subjects, so all subjects saw both types of products.
Fake versus non-fake products
As discussed previously, some goods in the marketplace
have inferior internal quality but have the outside appearance
of higher quality goods. To investigate whether maximizers
would be more likely than satisficers to choose an objectively
inferior good if it looked like a higher quality good on the
outside, an additional factor called Fake was manipulated
between-subjects. For subjects in the Fake condition, the
positional option was described as appearing to look like thehigher quality item from the absolute option. For instance, the
positional item for the laptop scenario for the Fake condition
read as follows:
A.1 Your laptop was rated 60/100 in quality by Consumer
Reports, but has the outside casing of a top-of-the-line
model (participants did not see the italics). Nearly all your
fellow students have low-quality laptops rated 50.
[Selection indicative of a positional choice]
For subjects in the Non-Fake condition, the item indicative
of positional choice was described without any reference to
appearance (see A.1 above).
Maximization scale
After making their choices, participants completed the
maximization scale (α = .67) (Schwartz et al., 2002), provided
demographic information, and were thanked and debriefed.
Participants' average maximization score in this sample was a
4.43 (SD = .76) and the median score in the sample was 4.38.
Manipulation check
Study 4 included evaluations of both visible and non-visible
products in the Fake and Non-Fake conditions. Since the Fake
condition emphasizes appearance and makes it a salient feature
(e.g., your mattress looks like a designer one), we wanted to
confirm that it did not interact with participants' evaluations of
the public and private products. A group of participants assigned
to either the Fake or Non-Fake condition rated all the products on
a seven point Likert scale ranging from 1 = not visible at
all—almost nobody would see it to 7 = highly visible—people
would see it. Paired sample t-tests confirmed that visibility
differences were of a similar magnitude in both the Fake
(Mnon-visible =3.17 vs. Mvisible = 5.07, t(22) = 6.23, p b .05)
and Non-Fake conditions (Mnon-visible = 2.92 vs.Mvisible = 4.59,
t(24) = 5.01, p b .05).
Study 4 thus used a Product Visibility (publicly consumed
products vs. privately consumed products) × Fake (fake vs.
non-fake) × Maximization Score (continuous factor ranging
from 1 to 7) design with Product Visibility a repeated measure
and Fake a between-subjects factor. Our main prediction was that
there would be two interactions, one between participants'
maximization scores and the private versus public nature of the
product's consumption and one between participants' maximiza-
tion scores and whether a product was described as a fake or not.
Results
To test our main prediction, a repeated-measures ANCOVA
was conducted using Fake as a between-subjects factor, Product
Visibility as a within-subjects factor, and Maximization Score as
a continuous measured factor and participants' mean tendency to
choose positionally as the dependent variable. The model
included all possible interactions of the variables (i.e., within,
between, and covariate). Analyses revealed significant effects of
Maximization Score, F(1, 99) = 4.9, p b .05, Product Visibility,
F(1, 99) = 4.5, p b .05 and Fake, F(1, 99) = 4.4, p b .05 as well
Fig. 3. Study 4: Regression lines for average positional choice as a function of
maximization score in the fake and non-fake conditions.
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Consistent with our main hypothesis, there were also significant
Product Visibility × Maximization Score, F(1, 99) = 8.8,
p b .01 and Fake × Maximization Score interactions, F(1,
99) = 6.7, p b .05.
To explore the Product Visibility × Maximization Score
interaction, we examined the simple effect of Maximization
Score on positional choice in both the Visible and Non-Visible
conditions. As predicted, there was a positive association
between an individual's score on the maximization scale and
their tendency to make a positional choice in the Visible
condition (β = .09, t = 3.91, p b .01), but not in the
Non-Visible condition (β = .008, t = .34, p = .73). Fig. 2
visually depicts this interaction.
To explore the significant Fake × Maximization Score
interaction, we examined the simple effect of Maximization
Score on positional choice in both the Fake and Non-Fake
conditions. As predicted, there was a positive association
between an individual's score on the maximization scale and
their propensity to make a positional choice in the Fake
condition (β = .11, t = 3.98, p b .01), but not in the Non-Fake
condition (β = .006, t = .19, p = .85). Fig. 3 visually depicts
this interaction.
Discussion
By demonstrating that maximizers' choices are influenced
by the public versus private nature of the product category and
the manipulated fake variable but satisficers' choices are not,
study 4 adds significantly to our understanding of how
maximizers weigh objective quality versus social standing.
Rather than looking to others for information about what is the
best product, in contexts where social rivalry is highlighted,
maximizers instead appear to be looking to others forFig. 2. Study 3: Regression lines for average positional choice as a function of
maximization score in the visible and non-visible conditions.information on who has the best product. In line with their
focus on wanting to appear as the best, more maximizers than
satisficers preferred imitation products. Simply giving lower
quality products the external appearance of high quality items
was sufficient to make them more attractive to maximizers.
Satisficers, in contrast, were uninterested in products giving
merely an external appearance of high quality.
General discussion
Summary and theoretical implications
The current studies build a theoretical bridge between two
literatures, one on maximizing and satisficing in decision
making and the other on relative and absolute choices. Past
work has identified two types of consumers on the basis of how
much they try to optimize in their decision making (Schwartz et
al., 2002). Maximizers are consumers who are exhaustive in
their search for the best product, while satisficers tend to
truncate the search process as soon as they have identified a
product that meets a minimum threshold of acceptability
(Schwartz et al., 2002). Previous work investigating individual
differences in maximizing and satisficing has operated under
the implicit assumption that there is a single “definitional” goal
driving maximizers' behavior—i.e., that they have a relentless
drive to obtain the best products in an objective sense (e.g.,
Schwartz et al., 2002). Building upon this past work our results
uncover, for the first time, that the maximizer identity also
includes an additional—and sometimes conflicting—goal, that
of a desire to be the best in social competition situations. When
presented with tradeoffs that forced participants to make a
choice between these two motivations maximizers were
actually more willing than satisficers to give up objective
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satisficers. Further analyses investigating maximizers' and
satisficers' choices over time suggested that maximizers'
interest in social standing is explicit and conscious rather than
driven by an implicit motivation that operates below their
awareness.
The current work also investigates the processes that underlie
maximizers' relative preference for positional standing over
objective quality, showing that it is moderated by whether the
outcome of their choice would be known to others or not.
Specifically, product choice has few implications for the
perception of the owner by others when the outcome of the
decision is not apparent to observers. Under these low visibility
conditions, we found that participants' maximization scores did
not influence their choices. In contrast, when the product has high
public visibility and its quality is apparent to others, we found that
maximizers and satisficers differed in the choices made. In this
case, maximizers preferred the option that increases their relative
standing vis a vis others more than satisficers, even when that
choice implied the acquisition of an inferior product. This
moderating role of product visibility emerged across three
separate but convergent methodologies—when product visibility
was experimentally manipulated by informing consumers that
others either would or would not know about the positional
advantage (study 3); when product visibility was varied
naturalistically by using products that naturally vary in the public
nature of their consumption (study 4); and when choices were
about imitation products, those that are lower quality but have the
outside appearance of higher quality products (study 4).
The observation that maximizers, as measured by the
Schwartz et al. (2002) scale, focus on their positional standing
even at the expense of product quality would seem to suggest
an inconsistency in the scale relative to what would be
predicted by the standard economic model and what would be
suggested by Simon's (1956) original conceptualization of the
optimizing and satisficing constructs. That is, Simon's seminal
insight was that cognitive and situational constraints prevent
decision makers from optimizing (“maximizing”) their choices.
In proposing this concept of bounded rationality, Simon was
agnostic about what decision makers were trying to maximize.
Still, implicit in both Simon's work (1955) as well as work on
the maximizer/satisficer individual differences distinction is the
notion that “maximizers” and “satisficers” aspire to the same
standard and vary only in their aspiration level for that standard,
with maximizers aspiring to a higher level and satisficers to a
comparatively lower level. In contrast, the current results
suggest that maximizers and satisficers, as operationalized by
the Schwartz et al. (2002) scale, not only differ in their
aspiration levels but also differ in their conceptualization of
what the “best” means. This discovery adds complexity to the
current literature and highlights differences in the conceptual-
ization of maximizing and satisficing as operationalized by the
Schwartz et al. (2002) scale and the classical concepts of
“maximizers” and “satisficers.”
There are two possible reasons why maximizers may favor
relative over absolute outcomes more than satisficers when the
two motivations are juxtaposed. On the one hand, maximizers,people who dispositionally go to great lengths to secure the best
in life, are likely driven, competitive individuals by nature and
thus may have as part of their self concepts the tendency to seek
both types of “bests.” This means that when quality is salient,
they maximize on that dimension and when relative standing is
salient, they maximize on it instead. Their competitive nature
furthermore may lead them to prefer relative standing when the
two motivations are juxtaposed (unless the situation is private
and no one will know about their superiority). Another
possibility is that maximizers may be more sensitive than
satisficers to the standards of others. Perhaps situations that
prime an audience (e.g., such as the “public” conditions of
studies 3 and 4) prime maximizers to imagine themselves in the
eyes of those others, raising the salience of the goal of winning
or being the best. Although definitively distinguishing between
these two possibilities is beyond the scope of the current paper,
each suggests that there are as of yet unmeasured constructs
included in the maximization scale above and beyond a simple
propensity to search for the “best” item in an objective sense.
Future research should investigate which of these underlying
processes underlies maximizers' interest in relative standing.
The current results also provide a new framework through
which to view previous empirical findings. Past work has
shown that maximizers are more interested in social compar-
ison than satisficers (Schwartz et al., 2002). In light of this
finding, past work surmised that social comparison information
is useful to maximizers because it provides a “social reality
test” (Festinger, 1950)—it helps them to cut through an
overwhelming array of options to gain information about
what is the best product in an absolute sense in situations where
the best is ambiguous from the context (e.g., Iyengar et al.,
2006; Schwartz et al., 2002). The current research suggests
instead that rather than using social comparison for informa-
tion, “being the best” may be a goal in and of itself for
maximizers in certain situations.
Limitations and future directions
The current studies used participants' choices of absolute
and positional products as well as their patterns of choices over
time as a way of inferring the importance of social position as
an identity process for maximizers. While this is an important
first step, future research should address limitations of this
approach. For instance, while the current studies investigate the
maximizer construct in terms of a widely-used individual
difference scale, identity-based motivation theory (Oyserman,
2007, 2009; Oyserman, Fryberg, & Yoder, 2007) additionally
predicts that the meaning of an identity is dynamically
constructed in context. This raises the interesting question of
whether situational manipulations, such as primes, of the
maximizer or satisficer identities would produce similar results
as those shown here. For instance, one could present
participants with survey items (e.g., “Getting the best is the
most important thing in life, otherwise why bother to search at
all?; Sometimes it is silly to run around looking for a better
option, because what you have is good enough”) along with a
manipulation of the response scale to induce people to endorse
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construct as measured in the Schwartz et al. (2002) scale is
similar to the maximizer construct as conceptualized, one
would expect such a prime to lead to a similar pattern of
results as found here. Another interesting possibility along
these lines would be to investigate whether priming the two
maximizing goals of absolute quality versus relative position
would in turn activate the concepts of maximizing and
satisficing themselves. For instance, to the degree that an
interest in relative position is a component of the maximizer
identity, then focusing attention on that goal as in a print
advertisement (e.g., “This is the dress that will make you stand
out at the party”) or in a product display that highlights the
exclusive nature of the product should increase the degree to
which people endorse a maximizer identity. On the other
hand, focusing on lack of search and “good enough” as in an
advertisement (e.g., “Why search any further? This refriger-
ator never breaks”) or a more utilitarian “something for
everyone” product display format should increase the salience
of a satisficer identity.
An additional limitation of the current approach is that it
uses a single scale to focus on both maximizing and
satisficing, two potentially only weakly related identities,
with low maximization acting as a “stand in” for the
satisficing construct. Future work that attempts to prime or
measure each construct separately, as described above, could
make it possible to more clearly test the relative contribution
of each to consumer choice. Doing so can also provide an
opportunity for a test of the cultural universality of the
maximizer identity. For instance, is maximizers' interest in
relative standing a goal that is particularly prevalent in
individualistic cultures, or is their focus on social comparison
universal and also present within a collectivist frame? Examining
the maximizing and satisficing constructs cross-culturally can
provide information as to the universality and composition of
these identities.
It may also be interesting to investigate the degree to which
maximizers' choices serve a functional role (e.g., Katz, 1960;
Shavitt, 1989). The fact that they prefer relative standing in
public more than satisficers, even when that standing comes
from counterfeit products, raises the possibility that maximizers
may be using their choices in either a social-adjustive or a
value-expressive manner, perhaps as a way to signal their status
or desire to be the best to others (Gino, Norton, & Ariely, 2010;
Wilcox, Kim, & Sen, 2009). It would be interesting to
distinguish between these two possible functional roles in
maximizers' choice behavior not only because it may provide
theoretical insight but also because recent work suggests that
usage of counterfeit products can have negative psychological
ramifications (e.g., Gino et al., 2010). While the focus here was
on the maximization construct in general, future research may
also benefit from investigating the different aspects of
maximization to assess which, if any, are more correlated
with maximizers' pursuit of relative standing and absolute
quality. Past work has indicated that there are distinct cognitive,
emotional, and behavioral aspects of maximization (Nenkov et
al., 2008). An interesting topic for future research thus may beto examine the correlation between these constructs and
consumers' tendency toward positional choice.
It is interesting to note that the current paper as well as past
work on the maximizing and satisficing constructs has focused
to a large degree on the motivations of maximizers and has paid
less attention to the underlying motivations of satisficers. One
reason maximizers may capture a larger portion of the research
spotlight is because that side of the spectrum seems to be where
“the action is.” Maximizers work harder and tend to do better
by objective metrics, but, at the same time, maximizing has
been shown to have negative psychological ramifications.
Satisficers, on the other hand, appear to be better adjusted with
higher levels of well-being. For this reason, future research
should be directed toward investigating the decision making
style of satisficers as it may be useful in uncovering aspects of
decision making that may lead to positive rather than negative
psychological outcomes.
In most of the choice situations we encounter in daily life,
quality and relative standing are confounded (e.g., the best wine
is also often the most expensive; the highest quality diamond is
also the most rare). This means that when consumers choose a
high quality item, the reason behind their choice is almost
always ambiguous—did they choose it because they are
seeking quality per se, or was the choice motivated by the
status that comes with the object? To avoid this ambiguity, the
current studies purposefully used tradeoffs that separated out
these two motivations in order to obtain a deeper theoretical
understanding of what drives maximizers' interest in social
information.The darker side of maximizing: Reducing the appeal of
counterfeit products
The current studies also bring to light one of the darker sides
of maximizers' preference for positional goods—their possible
willingness to consume fake or counterfeit products that have
the outside appearance of prestige goods. While some imitation
products are legal, other imitation goods such as counterfeit
luxury items are not and cost retailers millions of dollars a year
in lost sales and diluted brand image (Commuri, 2009; Wilcox
et al., 2009). One intuitive response is to discourage counterfeit
purchases by using the low quality of the products themselves
as a deterrent. However, the fake condition of study 4 suggests
that the consumers who are most likely to be interested in
counterfeit items—maximizers—are careful decision makers
who have likely already made a mindful choice to sacrifice
product quality in favor of the outside appearance of positional
standing. Instead, the current results suggest a different strategy.
Brands could create messages that present counterfeit apparel as
the opposite of a status signal. For instance, using a message
that highlights the fact that everyday consumers can often “see
through” counterfeit purchases and may judge the owner of
one as someone who is a “fake” should be more effective at
dissuadingmaximizers from such purchases as it would create the
possibility that such a purchase may have the opposite effect on
their image than the one they desired.
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The current studies show that in addition to “positional
goods” there may be an identifiable group of “positional
individuals” (maximizers) who are willing to sacrifice objective
quality for relative standing in a wide variety of situations.
Indeed, the fact that maximizers—decision makers whose
primary concern is in obtaining “the best”—are repeatedly
choosing objectively inferior products and outcomes is in some
sense ironic. However, choosing the worst in order to be the
best helps to illuminate the larger and more general conclusion
that the current paper has brought to light, namely that the
maximizer self concept is more complicated than has been
previously assumed and includes not only an aspect that
focuses on product quality in an objective sense but also a facet
that emphasizes social status and social competition. This
insight not only contributes to our practical marketing
knowledge by suggesting novel product positioning combina-
tions but also increases our theoretical understanding of the
relationship between individual differences in maximization
and the classical decision making concepts of maximizing and
satisficing.
Appendix A. Study 1: Choice Tradeoffs
A.1. Luxuriousness of your car– Your car rates 5 out of 10 points on a luxury scale; others'
cars rate 3 out of 10.
– Your car rates 7 out of 10 points on a luxury scale; others'
cars rate 9 out of 10.A.2. Quality of your car– Your car is a fair quality brand rated 6/10 on parts and
performance by Automotive Weekly. Nearly all of your
acquaintances' cars are low-quality models rated 4/10.
– Your car is a medium-quality brand rated 7/10 on parts and
performance by Automotive Weekly. Nearly all your
acquaintances' cars are luxury models rated 9/10.A.3. Quality of your sweater– Your sweater is a fair-quality brand. Nearly all your
acquaintances have low-quality sweaters.
– Your sweater is a medium-quality brand. Nearly all your
acquaintances have real designer sweaters.A.4. Number of job offers– You receive three job offers while others receive two job
offers.
– You receive five job offers while others receive seven job
offers.A.5. Level of your personal education
– You have 12 years of education (high school); others
have 8.
– You have 16 years of education (college); others have 20
(graduate degree).
A.6. Yearly income
– Your current yearly income is $50,000; others earn $25,000.
– Your current yearly income is $100,000; others earn
$200,000.
A.7. Chance of getting a job two months after graduation
– You have a 50% chance of getting a job within 2 months
after graduation, others have a 40% chance.
– You have a 60% chance of getting a job within 2 months
after graduation, others have a 75% chance.
A.8. Number of invites to formals
– You were asked to formals by 2 people and your friends
were asked by 1.
– You were asked to formals by 3 people and your friends
were asked by 5.
A.9. Personal physical shape
– You are slightly out of shape, others are very out of shape.
– You are in good shape, others are in excellent shape.
A.10. Sound quality of your MP3 player
– Your MP3 player has fair sound quality. Nearly all your
acquaintances have only portable CD players.
– Your MP3 player is a generic brand with medium sound
quality. Nearly all your acquaintances' MP3 players are real
iPods with high sound quality.
A.11. Time spent studying for test
– You spend 20 hours a studying for a test; other people spend
25 hours.
– You spend 15 hours a studying for a test; other people spend
10 hours.
A.12. Quality of beer you are drinking
– Your beer is a 4 out of 10 in quality, others' beer is a 2
out of 10.
– Your beer is a 6 out of 10 in quality, others' beer is a 8
out of 10.
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– You are going to Florida for three days during spring break
while others can only go for two days.
– You are going to Florida for five days during spring break
while others can go for a whole week.
A.14. Protection of your sunglasses
– Your sunglasses provide fair UV protection. Nearly all your
friends have very low-quality sunglasses that provide poor
UV protection.
– Your sunglasses are generic brand with medium-level UV
protection. Nearly all your friends have real designer
sunglasses with high UV protection.
A.15. Frequency of sex per month
– You have sex 5 times per month; others have sex 2 times a
month.
– You have sex 8 times per month; others have sex 12 times a
month.
A.16. Time spent training for athletics
– You spend 150 hours training for an athletic competition;
other people spend 200 hours.
– You spend 100 hours training for an athletic competition;
other people spend 50 hours.
A.17. Number of bids received for a fraternity/sorority
– You received a bid from 1 sorority and your friends received
bids from 0.
– You received bids from 3 sororities and your friends
received bids from 4.
A.18. Number of invites to parties
– You were invited to two parties on Friday night; others were
invited to one.
– You were invited to four parties on Friday night; others were
invited to six.
A.19. Frequency of going to movies
– You go to the movies 2 times a month; others go 1 time a
month.
– You go to the movies 4 times a month; others go 6 times a
month.
A.20. Quality of suit for interview
– You buy a suit for an interview. The quality is 6 out of 10,
others applying have suits that are 5 out of 10.
– You buy a suit for an interview. The quality is 8 out of 10,
others applying have suits that are 9 out of 10.A.21. Number of DVDs owned
– -You have 30 DVDs; others have 20.
– -You have 45 DVDs; others have 60.
A.22. What row your football seats are in
– You have 40th row seats at the [school name] football game
and nearly all your friends and acquaintances have 65th row.
– You have 30th row seats at the [school name] football game;
nearly all your friends and acquaintances have 5th row.
A.23. Quality of spring break destination
– You are going to New York for spring break, others are
going to Virginia Beach.
– You are going to Florida for spring break, others are going
to Cancun.
A.24. Grades on exams
– You get Bs and Cs on your exams while others get all Cs.
– You get all As except one B on your exams while others get
straight As.
A.25. Poker winnings
– You win $20 in a poker game; others win $10.
– You win $50 in a poker game; others win $100.
A.26. Number of Facebook friends
– You have 140 friends on Facebook and your peers have 90.
– You have 200 friends on Facebook and your peers have
250.
A.27. Number of rooms in house
– Your home has five rooms; other people's homes have three
rooms.
– Your home has seven rooms; other people's homes have ten
rooms.
A.28. Frequency of eating out per month
– You eat out at a nice restaurant 4 times per month; others eat
out once a month.
– You eat out at a nice restaurant 8 times per month; others eat
out 12 times per month.
A.29. Frequency of going out per week
– You go out 3 times a week; others go out 2 times a week.
– You go out 4 times a week; others go out 5 times a week.
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Manipulations
B.1. Sweater: Visible (Non-visible)
You recently received a gift of a new sweater. Its value is in
the fabric quality, so most people are able to tell its worth just
by looking at it (so most people cannot tell its worth just by
looking at it). Which would you prefer?– Your sweater is a fair-quality brand. Nearly all your
acquaintances have low-quality sweaters.
– Your sweater is a medium-quality brand. Nearly all your
acquaintances have real designer sweaters.B.2. Necklace: Visible (Non-visible)
You recently received a gift of a new necklace. Its value is
very obvious and noticeable to experts and non-experts alike,
so most people can tell (its value is subtle and only noticeable
to experts, so people cannot tell).– Your necklace is worth $5,000 and your friends are wearing
ones worth about $3,000 each.
– Your necklace is worth $6,000 and your friends are wearing
ones worth about $8,000 each.B.3. Sunglasses: Visible (Non-visible)
An innovation in sunglass lens development has been
established such that the color of the lens indicates the level
of UV protection of the glasses (such that a dot on the sunglass
frame indicates the level of UV protection of the glasses). So,
everyone knows the UV protection of others' sunglasses. (So,
no one can tell the UV protection of others' sunglasses.) Which
would you prefer?– Your sunglasses provide fair UV protection. Nearly all your
friends have very low-quality sunglasses that provide poor
UV protection.
– Your sunglasses are generic brand with medium-level UV
protection. Nearly all your friends have real designer
sunglasses with high UV protection.B.4. Salary: Visible (Non-visible)
At your firm, salary information is publicly posted at the end
of the fiscal year (kept very private). So, employees know (do
not know) each other's salaries.– You make $50,000 per year and nearly all of your
co-workers make $30,000.
– You make $60,000 per year and nearly all of your
co-workers make $80,000.B.5. Sex Life: Visible (Non-visible)
In your group of friends and acquaintances, information
about each other's sex lives is a frequent topic of discussion (is
almost never discussed). So, everybody (nobody) knows about
each other's sex lives.
– You are fairly satisfied with your sex life and nearly all your
friends have less exciting sex lives.
– You are satisfied with your sex life and nearly all your
friends have more exciting sex lives.
Appendix C. Study 4: Choice Tradeoffs and Manipulations
C.1. Visible Choice Domains
C.1.1. Sweater: Non-Fake (Fake)
– Your sweater is a fair-quality brand (but looks identical to a
real designer one). Nearly all your acquaintances have
low-quality sweaters.
– Your sweater is a medium-quality brand. Nearly all your
acquaintances have real designer sweaters.
C.1.2. Purse: Non-Fake (Fake)
– Your purse is fair quality (but looks identical to a
high-quality designer brand (e.g., Louis Vuitton)). Almost
all your acquaintances' purses are low-quality brands.
– Your purse is a medium-quality, non-designer brand.
Almost all of your acquaintances' purses are high-quality
designer brands (e.g., Louis Vuitton).
C.1.3. Sunglasses: Non-Fake (Fake)
– Your sunglasses (look identical to real designer ones but
provide only) provide fair UV protection. Nearly all your
friends have very low-quality sunglasses that provide poor
UV protection.
– Your sunglasses are generic brand with medium-level UV
protection. Nearly all your friends have real designer
sunglasses with high UV protection.
C.1.4. Shoes: Non-Fake (Fake)
– Your shoes are rated 5 out of 10 in comfort (but look exactly
like designer brand shoes rated 10). Almost all of your
acquaintances' shoes are rated 3.
– Your shoes are rated 7 out of 10 in comfort. Almost all of
your acquaintances' shoes are designer brands rated 10.
C.1.5. Car: Non-Fake (Fake)
– Your car is a fair quality brand rated 6/10 on parts and
performance by Automotive Weekly (but it has the identical
outside appearance of a well known luxury model rated 9).
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rated 4/10.
– Your car is a medium-quality brand rated 7/10 on parts and
performance by Automotive Weekly. Nearly all your
acquaintances' cars are luxury models rated 9/10.C.1.6. Cell Phone: Non-Fake (Fake)
– Your cell phone is fair quality (but its outside appearance is
indistinguishable from a brand name, high-quality model).
Nearly all of your acquaintances have low-quality, second
hand phones.
– Your cell phone is a medium-quality model. Nearly all your
acquaintances' cell phones are brand name, high-quality
models.C.1.7. Running Shoes: Non-Fake (Fake)
– Your running shoes are only fair performance (but look
identical to high performance ones). Nearly all your
teammates' shoes are low-performance non-brand name.
– Your running shoes are medium performance. Nearly all
your teammates' shoes are high-performance, brand name
ones.C.1.8. Backpack: Non-Fake (Fake)
– Your backpack (looks identical to a genuine top-of-the-line
backpack but is actually) is a generic brand rated 60/100 on
durability. All your friends have very low-quality backpacks
rated 50.
– Your backpack is a generic brand rated 80/100 on durability.
All your friends have top-of-the-line backpacks rated 95.C.1.9. MP3 Player: Non-Fake (Fake)
– Your MP3 player (is a knock off that looks identical to an
iPod but has only) has fair sound quality. Nearly all your
acquaintances have only portable CD players.
– Your MP3 player is a generic brand with medium sound
quality. Nearly all your “acquaintances” MP3 players are
real iPods with high sound quality.C.1.10. Laptop: Non-Fake (Fake)
– Your laptop was rated 60/100 in quality by Consumer
Reports (but it has the outside casing of a top-of-the-line
model). Nearly all your fellow students have low-quality
laptops rated 50.
– Your laptop was rated 80/100 in quality by Consumer
Reports. Nearly all your fellow students have top-of-the-line
laptops rated 95.C.2. Non-visible Choice Domains
C.2.1. Blanket: Non-Fake (Fake)
– Your blanket is fair quality (but looks exactly like a
high-quality imported one). Almost all your friends'
blankets are poor quality.
– Your blanket is medium-quality. Almost all your friends'
blankets are high-quality imported models.
C.2.2. Pajamas: Non-Fake (Fake)
– Your pajamas are a fair quality, generic brand rated 6/10 in
comfort (but look identical to real designer pajamas). Nearly
all your friends have low quality pajamas rated 3/10 in
comfort.
– Your pajamas are a medium-quality, generic brand rated
7/10 in comfort. Nearly all your friends have real designer
pajama rated 10/10.
C.2.3. Ice Maker: Non-Fake (Fake)
– Your ice maker was rated 5 out of 10 in quality (but its
performance is indistinguishable from a designer one that
was rated 10). Most of your acquaintances have low quality
ice makers rated 3.
– Your ice maker was rated 7 out of 10 in quality. Most of
your acquaintances have designer ice makers rated 10.
C.2.4. Mattress: Non-Fake (Fake)
– Your mattress was rated 5 out of 10 in comfort (but looks
exactly like a designer one that was rated 10). Almost all
your acquaintances have mattresses rated 3.
– Your mattress was rated 7 out of 10 in comfort. Almost all
your friends have designer mattresses rated 10.
C.2.5. Trash Compactor: Non-Fake (Fake)
– Your trash compactor is fair quality (but looks identical to a
high quality one). Your acquaintances all have low-quality
trash compactors.
– Your trash compactor is medium quality. Your acquain-
tances all have high-quality trash compactors.
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